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A Comparison of Two Different Theoretical Approaches To Commons 	Roger	A.	Lohmann	Emeritus	Professor	West	Virginia	University				The	following	table	was	developed	as	a	way	of	distinguishing	the	commons	theory	approach	of	the	Ostrom	Workshop	at	Indiana	University	from	the	evolving	commons	theory	of	voluntary	action	of	Lohmann	(1992;	2015).	This	document	is	intended	as	a	Free	Cultural	Work:	This	means	the freedom to use the work and enjoy the benefits of using it; the freedom 
to study the work and to apply knowledge acquired from it; the freedom to make and redistribute copies, in whole or in part, of 
the information or expression; and the freedom to make changes and improvements, and to distribute derivative works. (See 
creativecommons.org for further information). 
 
 
 	 Theoretical	Dimension	 Ostrom	Commons	(1990;	2007)	 Lohmann	Commons		(1992)	 Lohmann	New	Commons	(2015)	
Initial Problem Environmental resource 
depletion; overharvesting 
Character of voluntary action Voluntary action and 
democracy in Society 
Approach to collectivity Collective choice Collective action Collective action 
Theoretical approach Formal theory Substantive theory Substantive theory 
Definition of Commons (1) A commons is a singular 
resource that can be depleted 
but is not exclusive (e.g., 
water and grass). The term 
Commons are characterized 
by: 
1) Uncoerced action 
2) Shared Purposes 
Common goods association 
is characterized by: 
1) Uncoerced action 
commons informally refers to 
public goods, common pool 
resources, or any area with 
uncertain property rights.  
 
 
3) Shared Resources  
4) Fellow-feeling 
5) Indigenous sense of 
justice 
2) Mission (Shared 
purposes) 
3) Common pooled 
resources (CPR) 
Definition of Commons (2) Aggregations of resources for 
collective allocation 
Social institutions; associations, assemblies, informal and 
formal organizations 
Definition of Commons (3) Aggregations of resources 1) Natural commons 
2) Aggregations of human actors with resources.  
a)  Human-mediated natural commons 
b) Social commons 
 
Process Resource units are extracted 
(appropriated) from a 
common pool and the 
resulting products may be 
used by the appropriator for 
consumption, used as input 
in some production function, 
or exchanged with other 
actors. 
Critique: This process is characteristic of only some types of 
commons (e.g. agricultural commons) in which the CPR is a 
joint effort of “private” appropriators.  
In another type of commons, such appropriation for 
consumption, production or exchange by individuals or 
groups does not occur. These economic functions are 
controlled by the collective choices of the group or 
association of appropriators (or governors) 
As they evolve, common goods associations develop: 
1) Social Capital (philia) 
2) Their own distinct Moral Order (diaconia) 
 
Appropriation Externality One actor’s use of a resource 
can affect availability of 
resource to other users 
Critique: This condition is inconsistent with the non-
rivalrous condition of public goods, and points toward a 
separate, third category a.k.a. common goods that meet 
either, but not both specifications of public goods. 
 
Common goods The term common goods in 
conventional political and 
economic theory is a synonym 
for public goods.  
There are at least two intermediate categories logically 
“between” the pure types of public goods (non-rivalrous and 
non-exclusive) and private (rivalrous and exclusive) goods: 
These can be labeled: club goods that are non-rivalrous but 
exclusive. Community goods are rivalrous but non-
exclusive. 
 
 Instrumentalist, utilitarian, 
rationalist means-ends 
dichotomy: 
Means = resources 
Ends = goods 
Rules mediate relations of 
means and ends through 
decisions (aka rational 
choices). 
Critique: There is an ends-
means ambiguity in this 
approach between public 
goods and common-pool 
resources (See Figure below) 
Does the formal theory of 
commons apply to only one 
or both? Does formal 
commons theory apply to the 
entire top row of the Figure 
below (E.g., to political states 
and private associations) or 
only the top right? 
Substantive commons 
theory of voluntary action 
applies to “the space 
between” public and 
private: the diagonals (lower 
left and upper right) of the 
Figure below. 
Rent dissipation Occurs when actors in a 
common pool resource extract 
higher levels of resources than 
would be taken under the net 
maximum level (or optimum 
for the group as a whole). 
 
  
Assignment problems Arise whenever appropriators 
face a variety of 
 “appropriation spots” that 
are differentiated in 
productive yield. 
  
Technological externality Consequences of unequal 
access to appropriation 
technologies of differing 
levels of effectiveness 
  
Infrastructure Provision of infrastructure 
may improve availability of 
  
resource and/or productivity 
of appropriation (includes 
construction and 
 maintenance activities). 
Tragedy of the Commons In an open access CPR with 
no governance arrangements, 
appropriators will tend to 
over-exploit the resource and 
may destroy it entirely. 
Any association or assembly with shared resources may be 
susceptible to a tragedy of over-exploitation (e.g., by ‘free 
riders’) at any time. Leadership and governance are hedges 
against over-exploitation; not guaranteed preventatives. 
Drama of the Commons Struggle or conflicts in commons, holding out the possibilities 
of positive or negative outcomes. A preferable term to tragedy 
of the commons, which assumes only negative outcomes. 
The drama of the commons 
is one facet of the many 
dramas of democratic living 
Model of humanity Homo economicus The model 
of human changes depending 
on the action situation.  
Ostrom’s commons is built on 
Behavioral Rational Choice: a 
second generation of rational 
choice theory that 
incorporates effects of visual 
and verbal cues, norms of 
reciprocity and fairness, and 




Origins of commons theory The ahistoricism of the 
‘specious present’. 
Prehistorical forms of voluntary action and gift exchange 
coterminous with family and may predate trade and political 
state. 
Athenian Greeks originated philanthropy in ‘civic 
friendship’; developed pioneering knowledge commons. 
Roman law recognized trusts, ‘foundations’, associations 
and patronis/clientele (patron-client relations) 
Arab civilization 
Medieval European knowledge commons functioned within 
hierarchical society based on patron-client relations. 
Indigenous associations of common-field agriculture from 
the British Isles to Japan operated largely outside the 
political state. 
Enclosure movements, modernization, et.al. -> rights of 
association, assembly and expression 
 
Principia media Interaction based on rules 
created by users. 
Communicative interaction  
Key concept Common resource pools 
(CRPs) 
New Commons evolved gradually in legal rights of 
association, assembly, and expression. 
Treatment of self-interest Herbert Simon’s bounded 
rationality: Individuals seek 
goals but do so under 
constraints of limited 
cognitive and information-
processing capability, 
incomplete information, and 
the subtle influences of 
cultural predispositions and 
beliefs.   
  
Tocqueville’s “Self-interest, properly understood”: ‘Proper 
understanding’ of self-interest requires not only Simon’s 
‘satisficing’ and Lindblom’s ‘muddling through’ but also 
Hayek’s ‘spontaneous order’ and a standard of rationality as 
consistency. 
Social Philosophy Fallible human beings are able 
to construct institutions to 
govern themselves and their 
actions.  Once created these 
institutions are human 
artifacts, which can be altered.   
Pragmatism; social constructionism 
Key Freedoms Individuals are free and able 
to craft institutions.  Local 
public economies are 
established to govern the 
good/service/resource needs 
Association, assembly, religion & speech 
to reflect the attributes of 
good/service/resource.  These 
institutions are nested and 
create polycentric governance 
systems. 
Definition of Public  Dewey (1927) a group, of any 
size, that is affected by some 
substantive problem or issue 
Critique: Also accept the Deweyian approach to public(s) – 
plural - but also recognize it produces a notion of 
‘publicness’ that is radically divergent from and 
incommensurable with the economic model of publicness as 
non-exclusive and non-rivalrous ends. 





Goods Goods defined by 
subtractability and exclusion 
(public, private, CPR, toll) 
Sectors defined not by ownership but by types of normative 
goods sought: Public, Club, Community and Private Goods. 
Multi-disciplinarity Economics, political science, 
anthropology, sociology, law, 
psychology 
Sociology, social work, law, history & language-mediated 
social sciences 
Units of Exchange Finite resource units (e.g., 
water,  fish, radiowaves) 
consumed in rule 
environments that either lead 
to depletion or sustainability 
Tripartite exchange 
Patron-agent-client/beneficiary 
Sectors Two: Private and public Four: Public (governmental), Market (business), Commons 
(association and assembly) and Intimate Sphere (household 
and families) 












Difficult Public Goods 
     Useful knowledge 
     Sunsets 
 
Common-pool Resources 
     Libraries 
     Irrigation systems 
Easy Club Goods 
  Journal Subscriptions 
  Daycare centers 
Private Goods 
     Personal computers 
     Donuts 
 
 
 
Source.	Ostrom	and	Hess	(2007;	adapted	from	Ostrom	&	Ostrom,	1977).	
